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Abstract
Unemployment insurance recipients in the Netherlands were for a long time exempted
from the requirement to actively search for a job when they reached the age of 57.5. We
study how this exemption affected the job finding rates of the recipients involved. We
find evidence that the job finding rate of unemployed workers who were getting close
to the age of 57.5 is reduced in anticipation of the removal of the search requirement.
In addition we find a large negative effect on job finding rates of the actual removal of
the search requirement. Apparently, even for persons with seemingly poor job prospects
search requirements have a positive effect on finding rates.
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The labor market position of older workers is usually solid when they are employed, as it
is unlikely that they are laid off. When they lose their job however, getting back to work it
is much harder for them than for prime age workers. This is observed in almost all OECD
countries, although there exists considerable variation among the member countries (OECD,
2006).
The poor employment prospects of older unemployed workers are due to a combination
of demand and supply side factors. As for the demand side, employers may believe that the
wage of older workers is higher than their productivity or they may think that the skills of older
workers are outdated and not worthwhile to invest in. Hence, employers prefer to hire prime
age workers rather than older workers. As for the supply side, the low percentage of older
workers returning back to work may be due to the generosity of the unemployment system. In
a relatively generous unemployment system, older workers may consider unemployment as a
pathway into (early) retirement (Heyma, 2001; Gruber & Wise, 1998).
In order to offset the disincentive effects of unemployment insurance (UI) programs on job
search behavior, receiving UI benefits is often conditional upon being available for work and
actively searching for a job (Grubb, 2001). However, in many European countries the poor
labor market prospects of older workers are taken into account and UI eligibility criteria are
less strict for them (OECD, 2006). They, for example, do not have to meet the requirement to
actively search for a job. If indeed the labor market position of older workers is weak, imposing
a search requirement is not useful. Nevertheless, it may also be the case that older workers can
influence their job finding. Then abolishing a search requirement may be counterproductive
and reinforce their weak labor market position.
We examine how job search requirements for older workers in the Netherlands affected their
job finding rates. In our analysis we exploit the following policy. Prior to January 1, 2004, UI
recipients had to actively search for a job up until age 57.5. After age 57.5, UI recipients were
exempted from the search requirement. We find that the removal of the search requirement at
age 57.5 had a large negative effect on the job finding rate. In fact, already some time before
the search requirement was removed the job finding rate was reduced. Apparently, unemployed
workers who are getting close to the age of 57.5 reduced their search intensity in anticipation of
the removal of the search requirement. From this we conclude that even workers with a weak
labor market position are able to react to the requirement that they should actively search for a
job. Older workers seem to have at least some influence over their labor market position.
Our paper is related to Heyma and Van Ours (2006) who present an early and unfinished
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analysis of the effect of the search requirement on the job finding rate. Our paper is also related
Lammers, Bloemen, and Hochguertel (2013), who utilize the same variation in UI eligibility
criteria as we do. They study how changes in search requirements for older UI recipients affect
the transition rates to employment, early retirement and disability insurance. They find that
stricter search requirements significantly increase the outflow to work, as well as outflow to
disability insurance. Our paper differs from Lammers et al. (2013) as we not only examine the
effect of the removal of the search requirement, but also study search behavior in the period just
prior to the removal of the search requirement. Furthermore, we follow a different identification
strategy for reasons to be discussed in more detail in Section 4.
The contribution of our paper to the literature is twofold. First, our findings are relevant for
public policy in the context of an aging society. To alleviate the burden of population aging on
government budgets, many OECD countries have implemented various reforms that encourage
prolonged working lives. An important aspect of these reforms is to get older unemployed
workers back to work, and as a consequence, UI eligibility criteria are often no longer less
stringent for older workers.
Second, we contribute to the literature that links search requirements to job finding rates.
Often it was not possible to establish the separate contribution of search requirements to job
finding rates as search requirements are often combined with job finding services (see Meyer
(1995) for an overview). The Washington Alternative Work-Search Experiment and the Mary-
land UI Work Search Experiment were designed to study the impact of different work-search
policies for UI recipients. Johnson and Klepinger (1994) report findings from the former ex-
periment. They conclude that no alternative experimental policy (no search requirements, in-
dividual tailored requirements, job finding services) significantly increases the length of the
unemployment spell relative to the status-quo search requirements, which involved three job
applications per week. Klepinger, Johnson, and Joesch (2002) report findings from the Mary-
land experiment and conclude that stricter search requirements or employer contact verification
reduce the length of the unemployment spell. Furthermore, they find no evidence that wages,
earnings, and total income are affected. This suggests that higher nonmonetary costs of con-
tinued benefit receipt are compensated by more intensive job search rather than by a reduction
of the reservation wage. Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschênes (2005) report findings from
yet another field experiment that was designed to measure whether stricter enforcement and
verification of work search behavior alone decreases unemployment claims and benefits paid.
In contrast to the results of Johnson and Klepinger (1994) and Klepinger et al. (2002), their
results do not indicate that verification of search behavior caused shorter unemployment spells
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or lower total UI benefit payments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship
between search requirements and job search from a theoretical viewpoint. Section 3 provides
details on the Dutch UI system. Section 4 describes the data and presents an exploratory anal-
ysis. Section 5 discusses our econometric approach. Empirical results and various sensitivity
analyses are presented in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Search requirements and job search
Exempting unemployed workers older than a certain age from a search requirement introduces
non-stationarity in a job search model. Since UI recipients who do not comply with rules will
receive a benefit sanction, a job search model describing the particular feature of the Dutch UI
system that we study has to combine elements of a non-stationary search model, like Mortensen
(1977) or Van den Berg (1990), with that of job search model with sanctions, like Abbring, Van
den Berg, and Van Ours (2005).
Imposing a job search requirement may stimulate UI recipients who do not like to work, or
those who do not like to search for a job. To be more precise, we can consider the following
three groups of UI recipients. For the first group the optimal search effort in the absence
of sanctions is higher than the required minimum number of contacts. They will exert the
same effort regardless of whether or not search requirements exists. For the second group the
optimal search effort in the absence of sanctions is lower than the required minimum number
of contacts. They will exert as much effort as required for as long as necessary. For the third
group the optimal search effort in the absence of sanctions is also lower than the required
minimum number of contacts but they are willing to take the risk that a sanction is imposed.
The search effort of UI recipients belonging to group 2 will show a discontinuity at the moment
the search requirement is abolished. By contrast, the search effort of UI recipients from groups
1 and 3 will not show such a discontinuity. Specifically, for members of groups 3 search effort
continuously decreases either because of the belief that the probability of a sanction decreases
as they get closer to the moment of abolishment and/or because of the anticipated increase in
the value of unemployment.
If additionally the reservation wage increases in anticipation of the higher value of unem-
ployment, then, in the absence of duration dependence effects, the job finding rate will contin-
uously fall up to the moment of abolishment for all three groups, and be constant afterwards.
Moreover, for members of group 2, the job finding rate has a discontinuity at the moment of
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abolishment because of the discontinuity in search effort.
The population of UI recipients will be a mixture of the three groups described above. The-
oretical considerations suggest, unambiguously, that empirically we should find anticipation
effects. Whether or not we find a discontinuity at the moment of abolishment depends on the
relative size of group 2.
3 The Dutch Unemployment Insurance System
In the Netherlands unemployed workers are entitled to unemployment benefits if they (1) are
involuntarily and not culpably unemployed, i.e. they did not resign or were not fired for pressing
reasons; (2) lose earnings for at least five working hours per week, or earnings for half of their
working hours if employed for less than ten hours per week; (3) have been employed for at least
26 consecutive weeks out of the 39 weeks prior to unemployment; and (4) who are available
for work.
If an unemployed worker meets the conditions mentioned above he or she is eligible for
short-term benefits, which can be received for six months and which amount to 70 percent of the
minimum wage. If in addition to the “26-out-of-39- weeks condition” he also received wages
for at least 52 days in the four calendar years during the five years prior to unemployment, he
qualifies for wage-related benefits. Depending on labor experience these benefits last for at
least six months up to a maximum of five years.1
Labor experience is calculated as the number of years in the 5 calendar years prior to unem-
ployment in which the person received wages for at least 52 days, plus the number of calendar
years between the year that the person turned 18 and the 5 years prior to unemployment. As a
result of the “4-out-of-5-years condition,” the potential duration for wage-related benefits de-
pends almost completely on the age at which the person becomes unemployed. A UI recipient
with wage-related benefits receives 70 percent of the average wage received in the job from
which he became unemployed in the 26 weeks prior to unemployment. The level is regularly
adjusted to a general index of wages and limited to a maximum, which amounted to 152.62
Euro per day in 2001.
In 2001 the duration of extended benefits only depended on age. Persons who became
unemployed before the age of 57.5, were entitled to two years of extended benefits, whereas
older persons were entitled to 3.5 years. Thus, a person who became unemployed after the age
1With a labor market experience of 30-35 years the potential duration of the wage-dependent benefits is 3
years, with 35-40 years of experience it is 4 years, and with more than 40 years of experience it is 5 years.
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of 57.5 and who met the conditions for wage-related benefits, had a potential benefit duration
of at least four years, but it may have been as long as 7.5 years. He would therefore receive UI
benefits until the mandatory retirement age of 65.2 As of 11 August 2003, extended benefits are
abolished, except for persons 50 years and older. For them extended benefits are means-tested
such that those with a household income of 70 percent of the minimum wage or more do not
receive extended benefits.
In most countries administrators of unemployment insurance typically impose job search
requirements on the recipients to partially offset the negative impact unemployment benefits
have on job search. In the Netherlands, up to January 1, 2004, UI recipients had to actively
search for a job until the age of 57.5. Beyond that age they would still be obliged to accept
job offers but a job search requirement was obsolete. From January 1, 2004, onwards, all new
recipients were required to actively search for a job. Regulations specified that a person needed
to apply to at least four jobs in four weeks while these activities had to be reported at regular
time-intervals to the employment office.3
In practice the number of job applications a recipient needed to make were tailored to: (1)
the conditions of the regional labor market; (2) the number of “suitable” job opportunities; and
(3) the medical situation and age of the person. Whether or not a recipient fulfilled the search
requirement was decided upon by the case worker of the employment office. This worker also
decides what is considered to be a “suitable” job, taking into account a person’s previous job,
his education, and earnings. Generally, the longer the unemployment duration lasts the broader
the definition of “suitable” work becomes.
If a recipient does not comply with the rules, a benefit sanction may be applied. The non-
complying person can get a temporary or a permanent reduction in benefits (full or partial).
Concerning the severity of the sanction Abbring et al. (2005) write: “In practice, the tempo-
rary partial reduction of the benefits ranges from 5 percent during 4 weeks to 25 or 30 percent
during 13 weeks.” These numbers are percentages of the previous wage or replacement-ratio
percentage points. For example, a sanction of 20 percent on a worker with UI benefits equal
to 70 percent of his previous wage is left with UI benefits equal to 50 percent of his previous
wage.4
2It is known that in the past collecting UI benefits has been used as a retirement pathway (Heyma, 2001; Gruber
& Wise, 1998).
3The stated employer contacts may have been verified by the employment office but this did not occur across
the board.
4See Abbring et al. (2005) for further details.
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4 Data and exploratory analysis
4.1 Data and sample selection
We use administrative data from Statistics Netherlands which are informative about unem-
ployed persons who collect UI benefits. We use data on the inflow into unemployment in 2001
and 2004. The data contain the start and end date of UI-benefit spells (with censoring at 31
December 2005); the reason for termination of UI-benefits; the type of benefits; the number of
hours for which UI-benefits are collected; and whether unemployment is entered from employ-
ment or otherwise, like a period of sickness. Personal characteristics in the data include gender,
age, marital status, educational levels, nationality, and a profiling indicator consisting of four
levels of increasing “distance to the labor market.” Based on the reported educational level,
persons are stratified into three different classes: primary, secondary and tertiary education.
The indicator for marital status treats cohabitation as married. “Distance to the labor market”
is included by a dummy variable (phase 1) that equals one if the person has a “strong” labor
market position according to the classification of the employment office.
To study the effect of the removal of the search requirement we select workers who became
unemployed in 2001 at an age between 55.5 and 57.5 for our main analysis. These persons are
required to search for work as of the moment they become unemployed and are exempted from
it as soon as they reach the age of 57.5.5
In contrast to Lammers et al. (2013) we do not include workers older than 57.5 years at
inflow into our sample, and conduct a regression discontinuity type of analysis, because of the
following concern. In 2001 the unemployment system contained strong incentives for workers
to become unemployed after age 57.5, as then UI benefits could be received until the mandatory
retirement age (65 at that time). Thus, firms and workers could try to manipulate the age at entry
into unemployment. For example, firms might be willing to offer their employees not to lay
them off until they are just older than 57.5.6 Tuit and Van Ours (2010) provide some support for
this argument by showing that the inflow into the unemployment system shows a spike just after
age 57.5 in 2001 but not in 2004 (see also figure 1). Furthermore, the share of UI recipients
5Workers who became unemployed in 2001 at an age younger than 55.5 faced different rules than those older
than 55.5 when they were still unemployed at January 1, 2004. This is due to the rules governing the transition
to the new policy. Therefore, we select workers older than 55.5. Since we do not have data on UI records prior
to 2001 we cannot use them in our analysis. UI recipients who became unemployed in 2002 and who were older
than 56.5 and younger than 57.5 faced the same rules as the UI recipients in our sample.
6Such a response would invalidate the regression discontinuity assumption that the unemployment duration for
workers just passing the age threshold is informative about the counterfactual duration for workers who became
unemployed just before the age threshold. See also McCrary (2007).
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with a strong labor market position is much higher in the age group 55.5–57.5 (about 85%, see
Table 1) than in the age group 57.5–59.5 (about 75%).
In our analyses, we further focus on persons with a Dutch nationality, thus abstaining from
issues on the labor market position of immigrants. Finally, we select unemployed workers
who are non-seasonally full-time unemployed. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for both
2001 and 2004 on the covariates we use in the analysis. Perhaps most interesting is the high
percentage of the UI recipients in our sample who have a “strong” connection to the labor
market according to the employment office.
4.2 Exploratory graphs
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the job finding rate and the duration of unemployment
for workers who entered the UI system before age 57.5. Clearly, in 2004 the job finding rates
are lower than in 2001. After about 6 months the job finding rates are very small.
To provide graphical evidence on how the abolition of the search requirement at age 57.5
affected the job finding rates, figure 3 shows the relationship between the relative monthly job
finding rate and the months in relation to age 57.5. The top graph is based on workers entering
unemployment before age 57.5, whereas the bottom graph is also based on workers entering
after age 57.5. The job finding rate is computed for groups of workers according to their age
of inflow and duration of unemployment (in months). The relative monthly job finding rate
equals the average of the job finding rate of the (age at inflow, duration) combinations that
equal a given month in relation to age 57.5 divided by the a average job finding rate over the
window shown in the graph (i.e. twelve months prior to 57.5 until 12 months afterwards).7
In the absence of duration dependence, a value of 1.5 represents a 50 percent increase in the
monthly job finding rate. However, it is unlikely that there is no duration dependence effect.
Hence, the interpretation of the level of the relative job finding rates is not straightforward. The
graphs are still informative, however, about a possible discontinuity in the job finding rate at
age 57.5, because there is no reason to think that duration dependence is discontinuous at that
age. In figure 3 both graphs show a drop to a lower job finding rate after age 57.5 in 2001.
However, this drop does not occur exactly at age 57.5 but a few months later. For 2004 such a
drop does not seem to occur. By contrast to the bottom graph, the relative job finding rates in
the top graph tend to zero after age 57.5. This is explained by the fact that in the top graph only
7For example, the job finding rate at month -1 (i.e. age 57 512 ) is the average of (i) the job finding rate for
workers getting unemployed at age 57 412 and finding a job within one month, (ii) the job finding rate for workers
getting unemployed at age 57 312 and finding a job in their second month of unemployment, and so forth.
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workers younger than 57.5 years at inflow are used and that the job finding rate is basically zero
after 6 months (see figure 2)
A reason why the drop in 2001 does not occur at age 57.5 may be the fact that we do not
have information on how the removal of the search requirement was precisely operationalized.
Thus we do not know whether, for example, the UI recipient was relieved from the obligation
to search as of the first day of the month in which he turned 57.5, or whether this was from
the first day of the next month. Furthermore, the age of the UI recipients is only recorded
in months. Thus, even if we would now exactly when UI recipients were relieved from the
search requirement, the incomplete measurement of age would still prevent us from knowing
as when the UI recipients are relieved from it in practice. In the duration model to be discussed
in the next section we assume different moments at which the search requirement is abolished
and find that our conclusions are not sensitive to these different assumptions. Furthermore, we
formally model the imprecise measurement of age.
4.3 Exploratory analysis
To further explore whether incentive effects are present we group the observations in the first
12 unemployment duration months and 24 age of inflow months (age 55.5 to 57.5) from the
inflow in the two calendar years 2001 and 2004 into 576 “cells”. For each of these “cells” we
calculate the job finding probability. Then, we estimate a linear probability model in which the
average job finding probability in month of duration t conditional on age at inflow αj (j=1,..,24)
and current age a is specified as follows:
θ(t|αj, a, d2004) = αj + αt + δ11(57.25 ≤ a < 57.5)d2001 + δ21(t ≥ 57.5)d2001+
δ31(57.25 ≤ a < 57.5)d2004 + δ41(t ≥ 57.5)d2004 + βd2004 + ε (1)
The αt represent 11 duration fixed effects, δ1 (δ3) measures the anticipation effect in 2001
(2004), and δ2 (δ4) is the treatment effect in 2001 (2004), i.e. the effect of the abolition of
the search requirement. Finally, β represents the effect of the year of inflow and ε is an error
term. If the search requirement has an effect on the job finding rates we expect δ1 and δ2 to be
negative and significantly different from zero while δ3 and δ4 are expected to be insignificantly
different from zero as in 2004 there was no change in search requirement at age 57.5.
The parameter estimates are presented in the first two columns of table 2. The first column
shows that indeed in 2001 both the anticipation effect and the treatment effect are negative,
but the treatment effect is not significantly different from zero. In 2004 this is there is neither
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a significant anticipation nor treatment effect. Furthermore, the average job finding rates in
2004 are substantially lower than in 2001. The second column shows that if we impose the
anticipation effect and treatment effect to be zero in 2004, the anticipation effect and treatment
effect in 2001 are negative and significantly different from zero. The third and fourth column
show similar parameter estimates based on the first 6 months of outflow from unemployment.
These parameter estimates tell the same story, although the anticipation effect in 2001 is now
somewhat bigger and the treatment effect is no longer significantly different from zero.
5 Statistical model
We assume that differences in transition rates from unemployment to work can be characterized
by observed time-varying covariates (z(t)), age at inflow (τ), other observed time-invariant
covariates (x), an unobserved random variable (v), and the elapsed duration of unemploy-
ment itself (t). The job finding rate at time t conditional on z(t), τ , x and v, denoted by
λ(t|z(t), τ, x, v), is assumed to have a mixed proportional hazard specification (see, e.g., Lan-
caster, 1990; Van den Berg, 2001)
λ(t|z(t), τ, x, v) = λ0(t) exp(α′z(t) + βτ + γ′x+ v),
where β is a parameter and α′ and γ′ are vectors of parameters. Furthermore, λ0(t) repre-









where 1j(t) is the indicator function that equals 1 if t is in the j-th interval and 0 otherwise,
and where the µ’s are parameters to be estimated. We distinguish four time intervals: less than
3 months, 3–6 months, 6–12 months, and 12 and more months. Because we also estimate a
constant term, we normalize the duration dependence parameter of the first interval to zero
(µ1 = 0).
Let ta be the time until a person starts to anticipate the abolishment of the search require-
10
ment and let ts be the time until abolishment, then in our baseline specification we specify8
α′z(t) = α11(t
a ≤ t < ts) + α21(ts ≤ t).
The effect of the anticipation of the abolishment of the search requirement is captured by α1
and the effect of the abolishment itself by α2. In our baseline specification we assume that
ta = ts − 3 months. Since there is (a priori) no reason why UI recipients start anticipating
the removal 3 months in advance, we also consider specifications with different anticipation
intervals as part of the sensitivity analyses.
All persons in our sample have a search requirement at the start of their unemployment spell,
i.e., t0 < ts, where t0 is the moment at which a person becomes unemployed. Furthermore,
when our sample members are unemployed long enough and reach the age of 57.5, the search
requirement is removed. We do not require that a person is unemployed before the moment at
which we conjecture he starts to anticipate the removal of the search requirement, thus it can
be that ta < t0 for some persons in our sample. Let tu denote the completed duration of the
unemployment spell (measured in days). Then, the following situations can occur within our
sample:
1. t0 < ta < ts < tu: the worker enters unemployment before the start of the anticipation period
and finds a job after age 57.5;
2. t0 < ta < tu < ts: the worker enters unemployment before the start of the anticipation period
and finds a job before age 57.5;
3. t0 < tu < ta < ts: the worker enters and leaves unemployment before the start of the anticipation
period;
4. ta < t0 < ts < tu: the worker enters unemployment during the anticipation period and finds a
job after age 57.5;
5. ta < t0 < tu < ts: the worker enters unemployment during the anticipation period and finds a
job before age 57.5;
The identification of the anticipation and the 57.5+ (or treatment) effect is determined by which
of the five above cases apply. The identification of the anticipation effect is through cases 1, 2,
4 and 5. For the identification of the 57.5+ effect cases 1 and 4 are important. In cases 4 and 5
8It is possible to allow the hazard rate to depend on time (t), and the time until the removal of the search
requirement (ts), because ts is a time-varying covariate that varies within the sample. This is analog to the
reasoning in papers studying the impact of the potential benefit duration on the duration of unemployment; they
can allow the hazard to depend on time and the time until exhaustion (see e.g. Katz & Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 1990).
Note that it is not possible to separately identify the anticipation effect and the age effect.
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there is a correlation between anticipation effect and the “age at inflow effect.” Table 1 provides
information about the relative size of each of these five groups, with ta = ts − 3 months.
The unobserved heterogeneity component v is assumed to follow a discrete distribution
with two points of support, (v1, v2), where Pr(v = v1) = p, Pr(v = v2) = 1 − p, and
p = exp (η)/(1 + exp (η)). We normalize v1 to zero and estimate v2.
A key variable in our analyses is age at inflow. If age at inflow would be precisely measured,
the loglikelihood contribution of the i-th person would be
Li = di log f(t
u
i |zi(t), τi, xi, tai , tsi ) + (1− di) logS(tui |zi(t), τi, xi, tai , tsi ),
where di = 1 if the i-th person’s spell is uncensored and di = 0 if censored, where f(·) denotes
the probability density function and S(·) the survivor function, and where tai and tsi depend on
the age at inflow. In the data, however, age at inflow is reported in years and months only, and
hence it is imprecisely measured. Thus, the observed age at inflow is lower than the actual
age at inflow. How much it is lower depends on the month of birth, but unfortunately we do
not have this information nor can it be inferred from the information we do have. Therefore,
we proceed as follows: let τ denote the actual age at inflow, τ̂ the observed age at inflow and
assume that τ = τ̂ + ε, where ε follows a discrete uniform distribution with {0, 1, . . . , 30} as
possible outcomes, each with probability 1/31. The loglikelihood contribution for person i can








i |zi(t), τi + k, xi, tai , tsi ) + (1− di) logS(tui |zi(t), τi + k, xi, tai , tsi )].
6 Parameter estimates
In the absence of detailed information on how the removal of the search requirement was op-
erationalized, we assume in our baseline specification that a person was exempted from it as
of the first day of the month in which he turned 57.5. Furthermore, we assume that UI recip-
ients start to anticipate the removal of the search requirement three months before it actually
removed. The baseline parameter estimates based on the 2001 inflow sample are reported in
the first two columns of Table 3. The estimates in panel a. indicate that, in anticipation of the
removal of the search requirement, UI recipients significantly lower their search efforts. In the
three months proceeding the removal, the job finding rate is 25 percent (≈ 1 − exp(−0.30))
lower than in the period before anticipation. When the search requirement is actually removed
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(the 57.5+ effect) the job finding rate decreases by another 34 percentage points. This is a
significant effect, showing that even for persons with a rather weak labor market position a job
search requirement is an effective instrument in getting them back to work. Male workers have
a higher job finding rate than otherwise equivalent female workers. Unemployed workers with
secondary or tertiary education have a lower job finding rate. Also, the job finding rate for UI
recipients with a relatively strong labor market position is more than twice as high as that of a
recipient with a weaker labor market position.
In our baseline specification age at inflow is not included as one of the covariates. This
seems reasonable since the range of age at inflow is rather narrow. However, to investigate
whether this was the right choice, we also estimated a model including age at inflow as one of
the covariates. The relevant parameter estimates are provided in panel b. in the first column of
Table 3. Both the anticipation effect and the 57.5+ effect get smaller. The anticipation effect
is no longer statistically significant, but the 57.5+ effect remains significant at the 10 percent
level. The effect of age at inflow is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that it can be
excluded as one of the covariates. A likelihood ratio test (LR = 1.16) confirms that the baseline
specification is indeed the preferred model.
In panel c. of Table 3 we show the relevant parameter estimates if we include age at inflow
but not the anticipation effect. Now we find a significant negative effect of age, while the
negative effect of the abolishment of the search requirement is still significantly different from
zero but substantially smaller than in panel a.
In our baseline specifications we postulated that UI recipients start to anticipate the removal
of the search requirement 3 months before its actual removal and that the anticipation effect is
constant during this period. Table 4 presents the results of several models that make differ-
ent assumptions regarding the anticipatory behavior of UI recipients. In specification (1), we
assume that recipients start to anticipate the change in policy only 1 month before the actual
removal. Here, as well as in our baseline specification we find a negative anticipation effect.
The anticipation effect is larger than in the baseline specification, but the effect of the removal
of the search requirement is the same. In specification (2), we assume that recipients start to
anticipate the change in policy in the two months prior to it. Furthermore, we allow the antici-
pation effect to be different in the first month of anticipation relative to the second month. The
estimates of both anticipation effects, however, are very similar, suggesting that the anticipation
effect is constant within the two month period. Again, the effect of the removal of the search
requirement is the same as in the baseline specification. In specification (3), we assume that
recipients start to anticipate the change in policy three months prior to the removal of the search
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requirement. As in specification (2) we allow the anticipation effect to differ across “anticipa-
tion months.” The results indicate that unemployed workers start to anticipate the removal of
the search requirement only in the two months prior to the actual removal.
The results presented so far may be biased when persons are able to choose the age at which
they get unemployed. The discussion in section 3 pointed out that, at least before 11 August
2003, there were strong incentives for persons to get unemployed after the age of 57.5, since
in that case they can receive unemployment benefits until the mandatory retirement age of 65.
A first indication of this may be provided by the inflow rates by age. These do not show a
drop in inflow just before 57.5, but do show a spike just after 57.5. Tuit and Van Ours (2010)
conclude, based on the same data as we use, that “workers had some influence on the timing of
their unemployment spell and when possible they use this influence to their advantage.” So, our
results may be biased. Assuming that persons cannot postpone their inflow into unemployment
by more than six (three) months, analyzing a sample which consists of person younger than
57 (57 and 3 months) at inflow (and older than 55.5) provides evidence of the sensitivity of
our conclusions to the sample. The relevant parameter estimates are presented in Table 5,
specifications (1) and (2). In both specifications the 57.5+ effect is statistically significant and
the size is the same between the two specifications, but in both cases the effect is larger than
in the baseline specification. In specification (1) the anticipation effect is not significant, but in
specification (2) it is at the 10 percent level. These results suggest that our conclusions are not
sensitive to the “sample selection problem.”
So far we have assumed that UI recipients were exempted from the search requirement as of
the first day of the month in which they turned 57.5. However, as we do not know when exactly
the abolishment was implemented, we estimate two models in which we assume a different
moment of abolishment. In specification (3) of Table 5 we assume that the search requirement
is removed at the end of the month in which a person turn 57.5, whereas in specification (4)
we assume that it is removed at a person’s 57.5 “birthday.” Across both specifications, the
size of the anticipation effect and 57.5+ effect are the same, and in both cases the effects are
larger than in the baseline specification. The conclusions based on the results of these last
two specifications and are the same as those based on the baseline specification: there is a
large negative effect of the removal of the search requirement as well as significant anticipation
effects.
As a final sensitivity analysis we estimated our baseline model on inflow data from 2004,
to examine whether or findings are indeed due to the removal of the search requirement. The
parameter estimates are given in the second column of Table 6. Surprisingly, the results pre-
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sented in panel a. indicate that there is still a negative and significant 57.5+ effect although it is
substantially smaller than for the 2001 inflow. However, as shown in panels b. and c. the 57.5+
effect disappears once age at inflow is included. Furthermore, once we restrict the sample to UI
recipients flowing in after 1 July 2004, we find a 57.5+ effect that does not differ significantly
from zero (see panel d. of Table 6). These results support the view that the finding of a negative
and significant 57.5+ effect when using all inflow from 2004, is due to a delayed implemen-
tation of the reform of 1 January 2004. Another explanation may be that HRM departments
are not used to receiving job application letters from persons older than 57.5 and therefore put
them aside.
7 Conclusions
Older workers face a difficult labor market position when they lose their job. Their prospects
of finding a new job are not very good. Therefore, unemployment durations among older
unemployed workers are relatively long. For a long time the labor market position of older
workers in the Netherlands was considered to be so poor, that from age 57.5 onwards, UI
recipients were no longer required to actively search for a job although they still had to to
accept job offers. In 2004 this rule was abolished and the active search requirement was also
imposed upon unemployed workers beyond age 57.5.
In our paper we analyze job finding rates of workers who became unemployed prior to
January 2004 over a relatively short age span, from 55.5 to 57.5 years. We are particularly
interested in the evolution of the job finding rates as these workers got close to the point were the
active search requirement was abolished to find out whether any anticipation effects occurred.
Also, we are interested in the magnitude of the effect of the abolishment on the job finding
rate. It is not easy to identify an anticipation effect as job finding rates are influenced by
duration dependence as well as age dependence. Although we study job finding rates over a
relatively small age interval it may still be the case that age at inflow affects the job finding
rate. Nevertheless, investigating the job finding rates of these older workers we find that the
abolition of the requirement to actively search for a job had a relatively large negative effect.
Furthermore, unemployed workers who are getting close to the age of 57.5 reduce their search
intensity quite a lot. There is a clear negative anticipation effect.
The fact that unemployed workers anticipate the abolishment of the search requirement by
reducing their search effort is not remarkable per se but evidence of rational behavior. If search
intensity by unemployed workers would be driven by rational arguments an anticipation effect
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is to be expected. However, there is no rational for the downward shift in search intensity at the
moment the search requirement was abolished. It could be that older workers felt obliged to
stick to the rules of the game and actually kept on searching until this was no longer formally
required. This is all the more remarkable as job search is among the activities which are not
very popular among unemployed workers. Knabe, Rätzel, Schöb, and Weimann (2010) for ex-
ample study life satisfaction measured as a general feeling and momentary satisfaction related
to specific activities and find that UI recipients consider being employed as a desirable state but
they do not value the activities which would speed up the transition to this state sufficiently.
Thus, it makes sense to impose an obligation to unemployed workers to actively search for a
job.
Although the absolute increase in the job finding rates among older workers for whom
the search requirement is reinstalled is rather small, the fact that there is an increase at all is
remarkable given the relatively weak labor market position of older workers. Apparently, even
older workers have some influence over their job finding. Extrapolating our findings to younger
age categories it is clear that it is important to have well specified search requirement which
should be enforced to make sure that UI recipients keep searching for a job irrespective of how
long they have been unemployed. Even workers with seemingly poor job prospects seem to
benefit from the requirement to actively search for a job.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable 2001 2004
Age 56.4 56.4
Sex male (%) 84.6 82.8
Primary education (%) 15.9 8.1
Secondary education (%) 65.1 70.2
Tertiary education (%) 19.0 21.7
Not alone (%) 74.8 73.8
Phase 1 (%) 85.4 82.8
Completed spell (%) 40.0 31.1
of which:
Type 1 (%) 7.6 11.7
Type 2 (%) 8.6 9.3
Type 3 (%) 76.9 69.2
Type 4 (%) 5.4 7.6
Type 5 (%) 1.4 2.1
Sample size 1,606 2,778
Note that the types of completed spells are ex-
plained in the main text.
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Table 2: Parameter estimates exploratory analysis monthly job finding probabilities
First 12 months First 6 months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2001
Anticipation effects -1.59 (3.0)∗∗ -1.76 (3.4)∗∗ -2.77 (3.1)∗∗ -2.72 (3.4)∗∗
Treatment effect -0.82 (1.5) -1.15 (2.7)∗∗ -1.38 (1.1) -1.39 (1.3)
2004
Anticipation effect -0.21 (0.4) -0.59 (0.8)
Treatment effect 0.59 (1.6) 0.17 (0.2)
Year 2004 -1.84 (8.0)∗∗ -1.80 (7.9)∗∗ -2.90 (7.8)∗∗ -2.93 (7.9)∗∗
N 576 576 288 288
Note: All estimates are based on workers entering unemployment before age 57.5. All regressions contain 23
monthly age-at-inflow fixed effects; columns (1) and (2) have 11 monthly duration fixed effects, columns (3) and
(4) have 5 duration fixed effects; absolute t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses; a ** indicates
statistical significance at a 5% level.
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Table 3: Baseline parameter estimates for 2001
a. Baseline specification
Anticipation <3 months -0.30 (2.2)∗∗
57.5+ effect -0.65 (4.1)∗∗
Male 0.25 (1.9)∗
Secondary education -0.49 (4.4)∗∗
Tertiary education -1.05 (6.3)∗∗
Not alone -0.08 (0.8)
Phase 1 0.99 (5.8)∗∗
Constant -6.24 (23.9)∗∗
Duration dependence
3-6 months -0.30 (2.2)∗∗
6-12 months -1.08 (5.2)∗∗
> 12 months -3.30 (10.3)∗∗
v2 −∞
η 1.93 (1.3)
Pr(v = v2) 0.13
-Loglikelihood 4,727.10
b. Including age at inflow
Anticipation <3 months -0.18 (0.9)
57.5+ effect -0.49 (1.8)
Age at inflow -0.15 (0.9)
-Loglikelihood 4,726.52
c. Ignoring anticipation
57.5+ effect -0.39 (2.0)∗
Age at inflow -0.22 (2.1)∗∗
-Loglikelihood 4,727.45
N 1,606
Note that in panel b. and c. the same specifications
as in panel a. are used but only the relevant param-
eters are reported; absolute t-statistics in parenthe-
ses; a ** indicates statistical significance at a 5%
level.
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Table 4: Specifications with different anticipation intervals; 2001 inflow
(1) (2) (3)
Anticipation 2-3 months 0.04 (0.2)
Anticipation 1-2 months -0.54 (2.2)∗∗ -0.53 (2.1)∗∗
Anticipation <1 months -0.48 (2.0)∗ -0.51 (2.1)∗∗ -0.50 (2.1)∗∗
57.5+ effect -0.62 (4.0)∗∗ -0.65 (4.1)∗∗ -0.65 (4.1)∗∗
-Loglikelihood 4,727.5 4,724.7 4,724.4
N 1606 1606 1606
Note that the same specifications are used as in Table 3 panel a. but only the relevant parameters are
reported; absolute t-statistics in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates statistical significance at a 5% (10%)
level.
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Table 5: Other sensitivity analyses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age at inflow Age at inflow Removal at Removal at
< 57 < 57 + 3 months end of the month 57.5 birthday
Anticipation <3 months -0.09 (0.4) -0.24 (1.6) -0.45 (3.0)∗∗ -0.41 (2.9)∗∗
57.5+ effect -0.97 (3.1)∗∗ -0.99 (4.6)∗∗ -0.86 (4.5)∗∗ -0.88 (4.9)∗∗
-Loglikelihood 3,938.7 4,438.6 4,722.7 4,721.1
N 1274 1487 1606 1606
Note that the same specifications are used as in Table 3 panel a. but only the relevant parameters are reported; absolute t-statistics in
parentheses; a ** indicates statistical significance at a 5% level.
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Table 6: Parameter estimates of models for 2004
a. Baseline specification
Anticipation <3 months -0.16 (1.3)
57.5+ effect -0.33 (2.3)∗∗
Male 0.68 (4.2)∗∗
Secondary education -0.51 (2.7)∗∗
Tertiary education -0.87 (3.9)∗∗
Not alone 0.07 (0.5)
Phase 1 1.42 (7.9)∗∗
Constant -6.59 (22.6)∗∗
Duration dependence
3-6 months 0.35 (2.7)∗∗
6-12 months 0.08 (0.4)
> 12 months -0.03 (0.1)
v2 -3.07 (11.7)∗∗
η -0.94 (3.4)∗∗
Pr(v = v2) 0.72
-Loglikelihood 6,790.8
b. Including age at inflow
Anticipation <3 months -0.12 (0.9)
57.5+ effect -0.28 (1.7)
Age at inflow -0.08 (0.6)
-Loglikelihood 6,790.6
c. Ignoring anticipation
57.5+ effect -0.21 (1.6)
Age at inflow -0.10 (0.8)
-Loglikelihood 6,791.1
d. Inflow after 1 July 2004
57.5+ effect -0.24 (1.4)
-Loglikelihood 2,810.5
Note that in panel b. and c. the same specifications
as in panel a. are used but only the relevant param-
eters are reported. The sample size in panels a., b.
and c. is 2,778, in panel d. it is 1262; absolute t-
statistics in parentheses; a ** indicates statistical
significance at a 5% level.
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Figure 1: Inflow into unemployment in 2001
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